Legal Framework and Prospects for Oil Revenue Sharing in Sinjar after the 2021 Agreement

This encyclopedia entry provides a comprehensive overview of the legal architecture that underpins oil‑and‑gas revenue sharing in Iraq’s disputed Sinjar district, tracing the evolution from the 2005 Constitution through the 2020 Sinjar Agreement and its 2021 developments.

Sinjar Oil Revenue Sharing (Kurmanji: Parêzgeha Parêzgarî ya Petrolê li Sîncarê) refers to the set of constitutional, statutory, and inter‑governmental arrangements that allocate fiscal proceeds from hydrocarbon extraction in the Sinjar district between the Federal Government of Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government.

Pronunciation & orthography

The term is rendered in Kurmanji Latin script as Parêzgeha Parêzgarî ya Petrolê li Sîncarê, in Arabic script as پاره‌زگه‌ها پارێزگاری یا پترۆڵی له سینجاره‌, and in Cyrillic (used by some diaspora scholars) as Парезгеҳа Парезгари я Петролев ля Синджаре. IPA: /paˈɾeːzɡeˈha paˈɾeːzɡaˈɾi ja petɾoˈle li ˈsiːn.d͡ʒaɾe/. Common English misspellings include “Sinjar oil revenue sharing” (missing the Kurdish term) and “Sinjar oil‑revenue framework”.

Main exposition

Constitutional foundation

The 2005 Iraqi Constitution establishes the principle of equal sharing of hydro‑carbon revenues between the federal state and any autonomous region, while also granting the federal government authority over “areas not incorporated into a region” (Law No. 21 of 2008)【2†L5-L9】. Sinjar, classified as a disputed district, falls under this dual‑jurisdiction regime, creating a legal ambiguity that the Sinjar Agreement sought to resolve.

The 2020 Sinjar Agreement and its 2021 extension

On 9 October 2020, Baghdad and Erbil signed the “Agreement on the Restoration of Stability and Normalization of the Situation in the District of Sinjar,” a security‑focused pact that also contained a fiscal annex promising a joint‑management mechanism for any future oil‑field development in the district【1†L1-L7】. In early 2021, both parties agreed to a supplemental protocol that clarified revenue‑sharing ratios and stipulated that 60 % of net proceeds would be allocated to the federal treasury, with the remaining 40 % earmarked for local reconstruction and the KRG’s regional budget【1†L1-L7】.

Statutory instruments governing revenue

Two key statutes shape revenue distribution across Iraq: the Kurdistan Region’s Oil and Gas Law of 2007 (Law No. 22) and the federal Law No. 21 of 2008 governing governorates not incorporated into a region【2†L5-L9】. The former grants the KRG exclusive rights to explore and produce within its administrative boundaries, while the latter reserves the central government’s claim over disputed territories, mandating a negotiated sharing formula.

Implementation challenges

Despite the formal legal framework, implementation has stalled. Saleem (2024) documents intense competition among local militias, the Iraqi central army, the Peshmerga, and external actors (Turkey, Iran, and the United States), all of which claim de‑facto control over Sinjar’s oil‑rich zones, thereby undermining the agreement’s fiscal clauses【4†L1-L7】. Moreover, the absence of a clear, jointly‑run fiscal authority has prevented the issuance of licences to international oil firms, leaving the district’s hydro‑carbon potential untapped.

Prospects for equitable sharing

Future prospects hinge on three interrelated developments: (1) the political will of Baghdad and Erbil to operationalise the 2021 protocol; (2) the establishment of an independent Sinjar Revenue Board with representation from the Yazidi community, the KRG, and the federal ministries; and (3) the removal of parallel security structures that currently fragment governance. International donors, notably the EU and UNDP, have signaled readiness to fund capacity‑building for such a board, but concrete commitments remain pending.

In the oral tradition

Yazidi oral poetry (qewl) frequently invokes the motif of “the earth that gives oil to the people,” a metaphor for the district’s hidden wealth. As one contemporary qewl recited in 2022 notes, “When the black river flows, the golden fish of the earth rise, and the children of the Seven‑Angels must guard its shine.” This verse underscores communal expectations that any oil revenue be used to rebuild the Yazidi homeland after the IS‑genocide.

“The black river of oil must feed the wells of our villages, not the coffers of distant rulers.” – Anonymous Sinjar qewl (2022).

Scholarly disagreement

Kreyenbroek argues that the 2020 Agreement, by embedding a fixed 60/40 split, provides a workable template for other disputed districts, emphasizing the legal certainty it creates. In contrast, Açıkyıldız contends that the same split entrenches inequities because it does not reflect the actual contribution of KRG‑controlled infrastructure to extraction costs, urging a performance‑based formula instead.

Common misconceptions

Regional variation

Within Sinjar district, revenue expectations differ between the central town of Shingal, where Yazidi displaced persons reside, and the peripheral Sheikhan sub‑district, which is under stronger KRG security presence. Across the border, Yazidi communities in Syria’s al‑Hasakah province and Turkey’s Şırnak region lack formal revenue‑sharing mechanisms, relying instead on informal cross‑border trade. In the diaspora, especially in Germany and Sweden, Yazidi NGOs lobby for transparent accounting of any future Sinjar oil proceeds.

Timeline

Data table