Kurdistan Regional Government’s Role in the Implementation of the Sinjar Agreement

This encyclopedia entry examines the Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) influence on the implementation of the Sinjar Agreement, a 2020 accord meant to stabilise the disputed Sinjar district and address the aftermath of the 2014 Yazidi genocide.

Sinjar Agreement (Kurdish: Peymana Sinjarê) is a bilateral security and development pact signed in 2020 between the Government of Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government to restore stability, enable the return of displaced Yazidis, and implement Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution.

Pronunciation & orthography

Kurmanji spelling: Peymana Sinjarê. Arabic‑script: پیمانه سنجارێ. Cyrillic (for diaspora publications): Пеймана Синџаре. IPA: /pejˈma.na sinˈdʒa.re/. Common English misspellings include “Sinjar Accord” and “Sinjar Treaty.”

Main exposition

KRG’s Initial Commitment and Security Deployment

Following the 2020 signing, the KRG pledged to provide joint security forces, reconstruction funding, and administrative support for the return of Yazidi internally displaced persons (IDPs) (Saleem 2024). The KRG Ministry of Peshmerga announced the formation of a joint security command with Baghdad forces, yet the actual deployment remained limited and uneven across the district (MERI 2024).

Political Negotiations and Administrative Control

The KRG has used its political leverage to negotiate administrative control over key municipalities, arguing that Kurdish‑run local councils can better manage reconstruction. Critics argue this tactic undermines the Agreement’s intention of shared governance and fuels local resentment (Saleem 2024).

Funding Shortfalls and Development Delays

While the KRG earmarked $150 million for infrastructure projects, only a fraction of those funds reached Sinjar due to bureaucratic bottlenecks and competing priorities in Erbil (Free Yezidi Foundation 2024). The delayed road‑construction and water‑system repairs have hampered the return of displaced families.

External and Local Competition

Saleem (2024) emphasizes that the KRG’s actions are entangled with broader competition among Baghdad, the Turkish state, and local Yazidi leaders. This rivalry creates a “status‑quo” where none of the parties fully implement their obligations.

International Mediation and UNAMI Involvement

UNAMI’s Deputy Special Representative, Claudio Cordone, has repeatedly called on the KRG to honor its security commitments, noting that the Agreement is a “roadmap” toward Article 140 implementation (MERI 2024). However, UN reports reveal that KRG‑led checkpoints sometimes restrict humanitarian access, contradicting the Agreement’s humanitarian provisions.

“The Agreement is an achievement, but its implementation depends on the willingness of both Erbil and Baghdad to move beyond political rivalry.” – Rebar Ahmed, KRG Minister of Interior (MERI 2024)

In the oral tradition

Yazidi oral narratives (qewl) recount promises made by Kurdish authorities after the 2014 genocide, emphasizing a hope for protection and return. One beyit recorded in 2022 states:

“When the mountains hear the call of the KRG, the sun will rise over Sinjar, and the families will gather again.” – Anonymous Yazidi qewl (Free Yezidi Foundation 2024)

These verses reflect community expectations that have not been fully realised, highlighting the gap between promise and practice.

Scholarly disagreement

Saleem argues that the KRG’s pursuit of territorial influence, rather than genuine security provision, is the primary obstacle to full implementation (Saleem 2024).

Ahmed (MERI) contends that the KRG has fulfilled its core security commitments and that remaining delays are due to Baghdad’s slow administrative reforms.

Byman and Mako (Lawfare) suggest that the Agreement requires substantive modification to address the competing interests of Turkey, Syria, and local militias, implying that KRG actions alone cannot resolve the impasse.

Common misconceptions

Regional variation

Implementation dynamics differ across the district:

• Sinjar town – KRG‑run municipal council manages limited reconstruction, but security remains joint.
• Sheikhan sub‑district – Predominantly Arab; KRG influence is weaker, resulting in slower project rollout.
• Border villages (near Turkey) – Turkish security concerns limit KRG mobility, complicating joint patrols.
• Yazidi diaspora – Advocacy groups pressure the KRG to honour commitments, influencing international monitoring.

Timeline

Data table